The Puzzle of Veto Control: Veto Players, Cabinet Formation and Institutional Change in Advanced Democracies

Stream: Panel 33 - Comparative Politics: Cabinets, Parties and Different Models of Democracy 
Date: Tuesday, 27 September 2016
Time: 11.30 am – 1.00 pm

Abstract

There is a persistent puzzle in the literature on how strong second chambers or other institutional veto players affect cabinet formation in advanced democratic countries. For some countries, like Finland or Sweden, there is rather clear evidence that veto institutions influenced cabinet formation. In other countries, like Australia or Germany, it seems equally clear that virtually no effect on cabinet formation exists. The paper tries to solve this puzzle by modeling how "veto control" incentives vary across institutional contexts. The empirical analysis applies conditional logit models to a sample of 21 advanced parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies between 1955 and 2012.

Authors

Steffen Ganghof (Presenter), University of Potsdam, Germany
Steffen Ganghof is a Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Potsdam. His research interests include democratic theory, political institutions, political economy and political theory. His articles have appeared or are forthcoming in journals such the British Journal of Political Science, the European Journal of Political Research, Comparative Political Studies, Party Politics, and West European Politics.

Sebastian Eppner, Universit of Potsdam, Germany
Sebastian Eppner is a Research Fellow at the University of Potsdam. His research interests include coalition theory and political institutions. His articles have appeared or are forthcoming in journals such as the European Journal of Political Research, Research & Politics and West European Politics.